



**Irish Fiscal  
Advisory Council**

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# **The Macroeconomic and Fiscal Outlook for Budget 2019**

Seamus Coffey


10th July 2018

## The Macro Context:

- A rapid cyclical recovery has taken place since at least 2014 and this is continuing at a strong pace.
- There is much uncertainty, yet most coherent estimates suggest that the domestic economy has been growing faster than its potential growth rate since 2014.
- Estimates suggest that the economy is producing close to its medium-term potential in 2018 and will move beyond it next year and after.
- Little evidence of overheating pressures at present, but given the nature of the Irish economy this can change rapidly.

## Employment


% change y/y, volumes



Sources: CSO (outturn data) and SPU 2018 (forecasts).

## Underlying Domestic Demand

% change y/y, volumes




SPU 2018 forecasts  
generated based on  
expected upward  
revision to 2017 data  
for Consumption

Sources: CSO (outturn data) and SPU 2018 (forecasts).

Note: Underlying domestic demand is domestic demand excluding stocks net of aircraft (other transport equipment) and intangibles.

## Ireland's Cyclical Recovery


Output gap estimates (% potential output)



Sources: IFAC (June 2018 FAR) and SPU 2018.

## Employment Rates by Age Group

% population




Source: CSO.

Note: Employment rates by age grouping for 15-24 years, 25-44 years and 55-64 years are calculated as an average of quarterly employment rates weighted by annual population estimates.

## Prices and Earnings Growth


% change y/y




Sources: CSO (outturn data) and SPU 2018 (forecasts).

Notes: Core HICP excludes energy and food items. Earnings growth is a national accounts measure based on compensation of employees and annualised employee hours.


## Adjusted Current Account




## Household Debt



## Net Migration



## Adjusted NIIP



Sources: Central Bank of Ireland and CSO (outturn data); SPU 2018 (forecasts).

Notes: Adjusted Current Account excludes re-domiciled PLCs, depreciation on R&D-related IP imports and aircraft leasing, and acquisitions of IP assets and aircraft for leasing. Adjusted NIIP excludes IFSC and NFC activities.





## Near-term: upside risks from housing

- There are also burgeoning pressures in the housing sector, where persistent undersupply has been evident.
- Faster-than-assumed growth in housing output – although needed – could prompt overheating pressures unless offsetting measures are taken elsewhere.
- New dwellings in 2017: 14,446 (+45.7%)
  - 4,738 fewer than the number of connections

## Supply Indicators

Thousands



Sources: DoEHLG and CSO.

Notes: Commencements, Registrations and Permissions data are presented as four-quarter sums.

## Medium-term: numerous downside risks


- Negative shocks will inevitably occur in future years.
- There are clear downside risks over medium term:
  - Brexit;
  - US trade policy;
  - International tax environment.
- Other events that are currently unknown or unseen:
  - Regardless of sequencing or timing of these risks, the appropriate fiscal response now is the same.

## The Fiscal Context:

- Debt remains high and improvements on the budgetary front have stalled since 2015
- Ireland's debt burden is still among the highest in the OECD and is understated by standard GDP comparisons.
  - Set against a comparable measure of national income like GNI\*, the net debt burden is equivalent to 87 per cent, the sixth highest in the OECD behind only Italy, Portugal, Belgium, France and Japan.
- A strong cyclical recovery has taken place – one reinforced by a number of favourable tailwinds. Despite this, the Government's primary balance has not improved.

# OECD Countries' Net Government Debt


End-2017 net general government debt as % revenue (LHS); and as % GDP or GNI\* (RHS)



Sources: OECD; and internal IFAC calculations.

## Ireland's Net Government Debt


% GNI\* and % GDP, General Government basis



Sources: CSO; and internal IFAC calculations.

## General Government Balance & Primary Balance


% GDP, General Government basis (excluding one-off items)



Sources: CSO (outturn data); and SPU 2018 (forecasts).

## DoF Output Gap (Preferred Estimate)

% potential GDP




Source: SPU 2018.



## Structural Primary Balance: Deteriorating since 2015


% potential GDP, General Government basis, DoF preferred output gap estimates



Sources: CSO (outturn data); SPU 2018 (forecasts); and internal IFAC calculations.

## Structural Balance and the Medium Term Objective


% potential GDP, General Government basis, DoF preferred output gap estimates



Sources: CSO (outturn data); SPU 2018 (forecasts); and internal IFAC calculations.

# Fiscal Stance and Output Gap 2001-2021


Output gap (% potential GDP) and change in structural primary balance (percentage points) using DoF preferred output gap estimates



Sources: CSO; SPU 2018; and internal IFAC calculations.

## Revenue over-performance in first half of 2018


Performance relative to profile, €million



Sources: Department of Finance; and internal IFAC calculations.  
Note: Other Taxes include Stamps, Capital Taxes, Motor Tax and Other.

## Primary Expenditure and Central Gov't Revenue

% change y/y, 12 month moving sum



Sources: Department of Finance; and internal IFAC calculations.

# Fiscal Risks

- Corporation tax concentration risks
- EU climate change and renewable energy targets
- Budgetary pressures (public expectations)
- Spending drift
- Reliance on transient revenues; tax-rich sector activity
- EU Budget contributions

## Appropriate Fiscal Stance in 2019

- A sustainable real growth rate for the economy could be the Department's estimate of potential growth for 2019–2021 in SPU 2018, close to 3 per cent per annum.
- Including expected economy-wide inflation of 1.3 per cent for 2019 implies a maximum sustainable growth rate for spending net of tax measures of 4½ per cent.
- This translates into an approximate limit of €3½ billion for spending increases or discretionary tax cuts for Budget 2019.

# Appropriate Fiscal Stance in 2019

## Estimates of Average Potential Growth 2019-2021 (%)

IFAC	3.25
ESRI	3.3
DoF (GDP-based alternative)	3.0

## Forecasts of Inflation for 2019 (%)

GDP Deflator	1.3
Core HICP	1.2
HICP	1.0

## Reference Rate (%)

Potential Growth Rate + Inflation	c.4.5
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# Appropriate Fiscal Stance in 2019

## Expenditure Calculations (€ billion)

<b>Total General Government Expenditure in 2018</b>	<b>80.1</b>
Less Interest Expenditure	-5.3
Less EU co-financed current spending	-0.5
Less Public Gross Fixed Capital Formation	-6.8
Plus four-year average of Public GFCF	+5.5
Less Cyclical Unemployment Expenditure	-0.2
Less One-Off Expenditure Items	-0.0
<b>Corrected Expenditure Aggregate</b>	<b>73.2</b>
Multiplied by Reference Rate of 4.5%	3.4

The appropriate fiscal stance for 2019 would allow for net budgetary measures of up to €3.5 billion to be introduced.

Commitments have already been made for measures that sum to approximately two-thirds of this amount.


## Rainy Day Fund

- A recent working paper by members of the IFAC secretariat shows how a truly countercyclical Rainy Day Fund could work with modest changes to the fiscal rules.
- It explores how such funds can be used
  - (i) to address procyclical bias in measurements of the cycle, which underpin the EU fiscal rules; and
  - (ii) to enhance the scope for fiscal stimulus in future downturns while also making it more desirable to set aside savings in good times.

# The speed limits for government spending are rising as the economy grows fast

## Procyclicality of Allowed Real Spending Growth (Reference Rates) under the Fiscal Rules

% change y/y



Sources: European Commission (Autumn 2017 estimates); own workings.

Note: Data show the implied Reference Rates based on ten-year averages of the estimated potential output growth rates, which are derived using the commonly agreed methodology.



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**Additional Slides**

## Impact of a large, foreign-owned multinational firm exiting Ireland

- IFAC's June Fiscal Assessment Report highlights how corporation tax receipts would be particularly vulnerable to an exit of a large, foreign-owned multinational firm.
- This reflects the high concentration of payments among the top ten contributing firms.
- Corporation tax receipts are forecast to remain at record high levels and near their peak share of Exchequer taxes.

## Taxes, Earnings and Economic Activity

€ million unless stated


	<b>Total in 2016</b>	<b>Stylised Large Firm<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Large Firm Share (per cent of Total)</b>
<b>Taxes and Earnings</b>			
Corporation Tax	7,353	276	3.7
Employee Taxes/PRSI	15,997	62	0.4
Employee Net Earnings	30,419	79	0.3
<b>Economic Activity</b>			
Gross Value Added	255,294	4,975	1.9
Employment (thousands)	2,133	2	0.1

*Sources:* CSO; Revenue Commissioners; and internal IFAC calculations.

*Notes:* <sup>a</sup>The direct impacts of a typical large foreign-owned multinational firm on GVA, employment and employee taxes/PRSI and net earnings are estimated using the relative size of corporation tax payments for a top-ten firm compared to a top 96 foreign-owned firm ranked by corporate tax payments made in 2016.

## Corporation tax receipts


% of total Exchequer tax revenue



Sources: Department of Finance; and internal IFAC calculations.

Notes: Dark bars show outturns for 1984–2017; light bars show SPU 2018 forecasts for 2018–2021.

**Figure 7: expenditure growth 1998 - 2018 by interval**




Source: DPER databank



## Total Expenditure net of one-offs less Interest


% change



Sources: CSO; SPU 2018; and internal IFAC calculations.  
Notes: One-off items used are those assessed as applicable by IFAC.

## Real Total Expenditure net of one-offs less Interest

Using underlying domestic demand deflator, % change




Sources: CSO; SPU 2018; and internal IFAC calculations.

Notes: One-off items used are those assessed as applicable by IFAC.

## Comparing with Underlying Domestic Demand

Average % change y/y




Real Underlying Domestic Demand (excluding Stocks)  
 Real Total Expenditure net of one-off items less Interest

Sources: CSO; SPU 2018; and internal IFAC calculations.  
 Notes: One-off items used are those assessed as applicable by IFAC.

## Real Primary Expenditure Growth, 2016-2019

Using GDP deflator (unless stated), average % change y/y



Sources: AMECO; CSO; and internal IFAC calculations.