## Appendix C: The Council's Benchmark Projections (as of the morning of 28 March 2019)

## Benchmark projections for 2018-2024

% change in volumes unless otherwise stated

|  | 2018  | 2019  | 2020  | 2021  | 2022  | 2023  | 2024  |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Demand   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Underlying domestic demand <sup>a</sup>        | 5.7   | 3.4   | 2.8   | 2.5   | 2.4   | 2.5   | 2.4   |
| GDP  | 6.7   | 3.0   | 3.5   | 3.4   | 2.8   | 2.6   | 2.3   |
| of which (p.p. contributions)                  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Underlying domestic demand <sup>b</sup> (p.p.) | 2.1   | 1.8   | 1.5   | 1.3   | 1.3   | 1.3   | 1.2   |
| Underlying net exports <sup>b</sup> (p.p.)     | 4.6   | 1.2   | 2.0   | 2.1   | 1.5   | 1.3   | 1.1   |
| Consumption                                    | 3.0   | 2.6   | 2.8   | 2.7   | 2.7   | 3.3   | 3.3   |
| Government <sup>c</sup>                        | 6.4   | 3.9   | 2.7   | 2.0   | 2.0   | 2.0   | 2.0   |
| Investment                                     | 9.8   | -1.7  | 1.4   | 1.1   | 0.9   | 0.3   | -0.2  |
| Underlying investment <sup>a</sup>             | 14.8  | 5.3   | 2.9   | 2.3   | 1.8   | 0.6   | -0.4  |
| Exports  | 8.9   | 7.3   | 4.3   | 4.6   | 4.2   | 3.9   | 3.8   |
| Imports  | 7.0   | 7.8   | 3.7   | 4.2   | 4.2   | 4.1   | 4.1   |
| Underlying imports <sup>a</sup>                | 7.2   | 10.4  | 4.3   | 4.8   | 4.8   | 4.7   | 4.6   |
| Supply   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Potential output                               | 3.8   | 3.4   | 3.8   | 3.5   | 3.3   | 3.3   | 3.1   |
| Output gap (% potential output)                | 0.8   | 0.4   | 0.5   | 0.6   | 0.7   | 0.9   | 1.1   |
| Labour Market                                  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Population                                     | 1.3   | 1.5   | 1.5   | 1.6   | 1.5   | 1.5   | 1.5   |
| Labour force                                   | 1.8   | 1.6   | 1.5   | 1.9   | 2.1   | 2.1   | 1.6   |
| Employment                                     | 2.9   | 2.1   | 1.8   | 1.9   | 2.0   | 2.1   | 1.7   |
| Unemployment rate (% labour force)             | 5.7   | 5.2   | 4.9   | 4.9   | 4.9   | 4.8   | 4.8   |
| Prices   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| HICP   | 0.7   | 1.7   | 2.0   | 3.0   | 2.5   | 2.0   | 2.0   |
| Personal consumption deflator                  | 1.4   | 2.3   | 2.6   | 3.5   | 3.0   | 2.5   | 2.5   |
| GDP deflator                                   | 1.5   | 2.6   | 1.8   | 2.1   | 2.1   | 2.0   | 2.2   |
| Other  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Nominal GNI* <sup>d</sup>                      | 15.1  | 4.5   | 4.3   | 4.7   | 4.4   | 4.1   | 4.0   |
| Nominal GDP                                    | 8.3   | 5.6   | 5.3   | 5.5   | 4.9   | 4.7   | 4.6   |
| Nominal GDP (€ billion)                        | 318.5 | 336.3 | 354.3 | 373.8 | 392.3 | 410.7 | 429.4 |
| Modified current account (% GNI*) <sup>d</sup> | 4.8   | 5.0   | 4.4   | 4.0   | 3.6   | 3.0   | 2.6   |

Sources: CSO; and internal IFAC calculations.

*Notes*: <sup>a</sup> Underlying (final) domestic demand, underlying investment, and underlying imports exclude "other transport equipment" (mainly aircraft) and intangibles. <sup>b</sup> Underlying contributions to real GDP growth rates in percentage points—here underlying net exports includes the effect of changes in inventories, and excludes the effect of investment in aircraft and intangible assets. <sup>c</sup> As discussed in Chapter 3, the *SPU 2019* forecasts for the growth in volume of government consumption over the medium term may be too low. <sup>d</sup> IFAC estimates for 2018.